'Goughie' The life of General Sir Hubert Gough

[stiletto_33853]

Hi Arm,

Still waiting for my computer to have its hard drive renewed after it fried itself last weekend so doing this on a lap-top at present.

Stanhope was on the staff at Versailles at this time in the War.

Andy

[armourersergeant]

Thanks Andy, so he had no reason to defend Gough in any of his statements about him. Both these and the others you posted sometime ago in a different thread.

Regards

Arm

[ianw]

I share Andy's view that Gough was hung out to dry for March 1918 - a senior figure had to take the blame. Goughie's "thrusting" style was no longer flavour of the month as the question of manpower became more sharply focused on. Gough complained loud and long about his treatment and this seems justified - but after the victory, no one was much interested in refighting the Kaiserschlact.

Fascinating to see the footage of Gough in 1942 - incidentally, I am still trying to confirm details of his burial location in St John's Camberley Churchyard - or indeed if he is buried there at all as his cremation seems to have been reported in The Times (But perhaps just his ashes were interred)

[stiletto_33853]

Arm,

No reason to defend Gough at all. Something else that always sticks in my mind re the build up for the March offensive also comes from Stanhope but I have come across other references to it as well. You know of what they called "The Game" at Versailles ?, primarily the work on a paper by General Studd on what would be the result of an attack by the Germans. The results of which proved extraordinarily accurate. If you are not aware of the contents of this I will place the findings here for your perusal.

"The game was played before Sir William Robertson on 10th January and he asked innumerable questions which were answered. He then asked if the French had played this game and appeared cheered when told they had not, but relapsed into gloom when Henry Wilson told him that we were in close co-operation with the French section and that they agreed fully with our conclusions.

Lloyd George summoned Sir Douglas Haig to witness this same war game played before the Cabinet or War Cabinet by Sir Henry Wilson, but I was told by one of those present that Sir Douglas Haig read a paper throughout the whole proceeding. Henry Wilson's lecture, first as a Boche, then as an Ally, followed by a masterly summing up, was described to me as extraordinarily vivid and, as events proved, prophetic. Sir Douglas Haig however made no comment and apparently took no interest

The only two material results of all our work and thought were that General Hastings Anderson, MGGS of the First Army, saw the game and was so impressed that he went back and built strong lines far in the rear protecting the right flank of the First Army. These lines came into use and were invaluable in preventing the Germans exploiting their successes northwards. The strong lines in the rear of the First Army Front also may have caused the enemy not to attack that Army except opposite the Portugese.

The other result was accidental. M Branch asked the GHQ railway people a series of questions about moving large numbers of divisions to the south of Arras, and this their GHQ people worked out for us until it was discovered and stopped by GHQ. Fortunately the work was practically done, and when the battle actually began their railway moves were to hand, worked out and ready !"

[armourersergeant]

I had not heard of that, an interesting peice. Is there any more detailed info on this I can read up on? Interesting that Haig seems to have poo poo'd it.

regards

Arm

[stiletto_33853]

Arm,

When my computer up and running again I will have to scan and send it to you, but this is from Stanhope.

On joining the Military Staff of the Supreme War Concil early in January 1918 I found General Studd hard at work in thinking out what would be the result of an attack by the Germans on the scale which their reinforcements from the Russian Front made possible, an attack which it was obvious the Germans intended to make in the Spring, but the results of which no-one at that time had attempted to foresee. E Branch estimated that by April 1918 the Germans would have available for an attack a force of ninety six divisions which could be replaced, when exhausted, by exchanging them with fresh divisions holding the line elsewhere, a process we described as a 'roulement' of divisions.

In order to arrive at the results of such an attack, when it would take place and how it should best be met, we had to take certain axioms on which to work, and although we fully expected that some of these axioms would be disputed, they were not even challenged, though it is only right to add that as both our GHQ in France and the War Office looked on us with the utmost suspicion and dislike - we were called either the 'Soviet' of the Riflemen's Rest (owing to the number of Greenjackets serving under Henry Wilson) - it is doubtful if they paid any attention to what we wrote. Results however proved the correctness of our assumptions, which of course had been founded on our earlier war experiences.

[stiletto_33853]

The main axioms which we laid down were these:

(1) If the forces available for defence were half the strength of the forces employed in the attack the defence would be able generally to hold it's own, but a lower proportion would presage a disaster.

(2) Failing an overwhelming success leading to a complete breakthrough, or in the absence of a complete failure, an attacking froce might hope to penetrate the defence to a depth equal to half the length of the front attacked, for instance, if an attack were launched on a front of fifty kilometres, it might expect to penetrate the defences to a depth of twenty-five kilometres.

As regards the first axiom, where the Third Army was approximately equal to half the strength of the Germans in the attack of March - April 1918, it succeeded generally in holding its own. Where it was more heavily outnumbered than two to one, it was driven back, and in the case of the Fifth Army under General Gough, which was outnumbered by as much as five or seven to one, the British Forces were overwhelmed.

As regards the second axiom, the German attack penetrated to a depth of slightly more than half the frontage attacked viz. to a depth of sixty kilometres on a frontage of ninety to one hundred kilometres.

Keeping the second axiom in mind, we next had to consider which part of the Allied line the Germans would be most likely to attack, as giving them the most valuable results. Four places appeared to be vital to the Allies, viz. Calais, Boulogne, Amiens and Paris. It was obvious that if the Germans hoped for a complete breakthrough, they would aim at one or more of these places. On the other hand, if they only hoped to achieve a great moral effect, they might prefer to seize the coal mines about Bruay or the munitions factories about Nancy with the salt mines near Luneville nearby.

[stiletto_33853]

The enemy might however, decide to attack at a point where, if their attack succeeded in penetrating to a depth laid down in our axiom, they might expect to capture places whose importance was such that further big developments might follow. The places in this connection considered by A and E branches to be of first class importance were the railway junctions of Hazebrouck, Lillers, St. Pol, Compiegne and Chalons. If any of those places were seized by the enemy or even made unusable by the Allies, the task of reinforcing the troops in the vicinity became a much more difficult operation and might entail a retirement of the line over a wide sector.

E branch (in conjunction with M branch) had also to take one further factor into consideration; whether railway communcations behind the German front were such that food, ammunition and reinforcements could be brought up in sufficient quantities to maintain the battle.

Finally it was decided that the enemy would probably deliver their attack from La Bassee Canal to twenty kilometres south of Arras, the country further north being too wet for an attack to be made until the Summer was well advanced and the Somme area, after the battle of 1916, being insufficiently supplied with roads. An attack in the area from La Bassee south of Arras might expect to achieve the fall of Liilers and St. Pol, and the capture of the Bruay coal mines and also to make impossible the use by the British of the military junction at Hazebrouck. Such a success might lead either to the seperation of the British and French Armies and the exposure of the French Forces to an enveloping attack during an advance on Paris, or to the withdrawal of the Allied Armies behind the Somme and the fall of the Channel ports.

[stiletto_33853]

E branch decided that the enemy would probably attack in three echelons, each echelon composed of thirty two divisions and each division on a front of 1500 metres, which gave a total frontage of attack of forty-eight kilometres. A branch suggested that the enemy attack would be more difficult for the Allies to withstand if the enemy attacked in two echelons of forty-eight divisions each, viz. on the wider frontage of seventy-two kilometres. E branch however preferred to retain three echelons and Sir Henry Wilson then said to Genral Studd, "Now then Bertie, put your troops on the map," that is, show how to meet this attack. Although this forecast of the attack was made in January, it proved very nearly accurate. The Germans attacked from opposite Arras southwards to below St. Quentin, and they attacked in two echelons over a frontage of about ninety kilometres, including salients which they cut off but did not actually attack.

[armourersergeant]

Thanks Andy,

Interesting that it had been predicted like this. I was aware that an attack was 'expected' and that it was felt it would come from the reinforcements from the Russian front.

I am concious we are moving a little away from Gough and 5th Army etc, however...

The inference is that Haig paid little attention to this 'game' did Robertson pay much attention to it? Given that Wilson was in charge I am thinking that Robertson would not have taken the information on board!

Thanks when your computer is up and running I would apprecate a copy.

regards

Arm

[Jonathan Saunders]

Andy,

Some broad comments to add to the very valid points you made when you joined the thread:

I agree GHQ must accept a great deal of criticism regarding Fifth Army resources and the defensive operations relating to March offensive.

However if we take the view that Gough had to do the best with what he had – did he? In relation to his resources were his tactics appropriate to defend the sector he was given? Were his orders downwards clear and precise? Did he show an understanding of his opponent? Had he learnt from previous experiences? My view is that he failed in these matters.

Overall was Gough purely to blame? Absolutely not but he did show an ineptitude and a failure to have learnt or understood his opponent – along with GHQ. Neither appear to have understood the rudiments of an elastic defence or came anywhere close to approximating the weight of the German offensive. From memory, during January 1918, Rawlinson was urging Haig/GHQ to circulate the findings of the enquiry on the 30 Nov 1917 German counter offensive and Rawlinson was asking Haig to specifically ensure that Gough was up to speed (I assume as Rawlinson was aware Gough was a weak link). At this point (Jan 1918) I don’t believe Haig/GHQ thought Germany would launch their offensive until end May at the earliest.

You correctly identify that Byng of Third Army escapes criticism and it is clearly wrong that he did so. Byng was little better than Gough in the March Offensive, which is a great disappointment. However I believe in the first 36 hours or so, Byng was also tricked by misleading reports being fed back from Fifth Army (as were GHQ, but certainly by the time the gravity of the situation became apparent, GHQ should have made closer contact with Fifth Army to establish facts).

Regards,

Jonathan S

[ianw]

Interesting just how much personal animosities at the very top of the Army influenced these events - I can quite imagine DH blanking an HW inspired war-game - do we know when this occured. I wonder if DH mentions it in his diary.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Interesting just how much personal animosities at the very top of the Army influenced these events - I can quite imagine DH blanking an HW inspired war-game - do we know when this occured. I wonder if DH mentions it in his diary.

From the Bourne/Sheffield version:

"Monday 14 Jan...

Wilson has arrived at his conclusion [so he writes] as the result of a War Game and on mathematical calculations. The whole position would be laughable but for the seriousness of it ..."

Unless I have missed it I cannot see that this version of his diary mentions Haig personally being instructed in the War Game at any time.

[ianw]

Jon - Interesting.

Thanks for finding the diary entry - Yes maths/statistics can be unilluminating but you don't have to be Einstein to take on board the implications of being outnumbered by 5 or 7 to 1.

In the diary entry Haig clearly shows his acute dislike of the "Versailles gentlemen" who he writes " have no responsibility" How ironic that the War Council modelling of the German attack was bang on the money.

Haig's outlook on maths is perhaps a strange one for a man fighting a war based on achieving material/manpower superiority. He was obviously not a mathematical dunce having come through Staff College.

[stiletto_33853]

Interesting debate folks,

Arm,

From early January General Studd and A Branch had been working at the problem of how to meet a German Attack by 100 divisions, and on the 20th January General Studd produced a paper, "The Security of the Allied Line in France," in which it was pointed out that neither the British Army in France of fifty-seven divisions nor the French Army of ninety-seven divisions could expect, while holding the line elsewhere, to withstand an attack by 100 German divisions, replaced by further fresh divisions as the first enemy divisions became worn out. So, the problem was known.

Jon,

As I would expect some valid, pertinent and good points in your last post.

Yes, GHQ and Haig should accept a great deal of criticism regarding Fifth Army resources and the defensive operations in March, but, do they????? or was a lot of it piled on Gough's shoulders. I am not sticking up for the man in anyway whatsoever but feel that he was made a scapegoat for the GHQ and Haig to offload on and cover their backs.

Did Gough do the best that he could with what he had?? interesting, had he learnt from previous experiences ? possibly the ordering the forward movement of his Reseve, going over GHQ's head shows he had some idea, maybe. If he had not done this where would the next line of defence been, on the beaches????? not quite, but you get the jist.

Byng being tricked by misleading reports, this appears to be a two way street, refer to post #22 and Milner's memorandum of 28/3/1918 "that the falsity had it's original source mainly in reports from Third Army and lack of reports from the Fifth Army."

Just a quick note here from memory, I seem to remember that the Third Army's principal losses were on the left and centre of it's battle line, where the operations of the Fifth Army could not and did not have a lot practical bearing on Byng.

Jon, interesting re Rawlinson and the Cambrai paper, playing devil's advocate here for a moment. Rawlinson headed up the British at Versailles and would have had knowledge of Studd's work and paper, throwing something in here without any knowledge, but could Rawlinson have realised where the attack was going to take place and know of the situation regarding the Fifth Army there, what with taking over the poor French sector and manpower. Hence ensuring Gough got up to speed, or, do you believe that Rawlinson believed Gough himself was the weak link???

Looks like we may have a good discussion here in a couple of weeks time Jon, maybe on the boat and over a beer later on.

Andy

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jon, interesting re Rawlinson and the Cambrai paper, playing devil's advocate here for a moment. Rawlinson headed up the British at Versailles and would have had knowledge of Studd's work and paper, throwing something in here without any knowledge, but could Rawlinson have realised where the attack was going to take place and know of the situation regarding the Fifth Army there, what with taking over the poor French sector and manpower. Hence ensuring Gough got up to speed, or, do you believe that Rawlinson believed Gough himself was the weak link???

Possibly but I think Rawlinson was a much more intuitive battlefield commander than history has given him credit for. I think he realised the coming German offensive would be based on the model used at Cambrai on 30 Nov 1917 and this was his drive to ensure the information was disseminated as much as possible. I think Rawlinson also had doubts about Gough -who had been reckless and repeated similar tactical errors in the opening of Third Ypres as had happened on the Somme. I dont think Rawlinson viewed Gough as a thinking General.

Regards,

Jonathan S

[David Filsell]

I will freely admit that I have long held the view that 'Charger' Gough should have been sent home long before he finally was, so it was pleasing to find this in a new book (which I heartily recommend).

"Service in the 5th Army was hated by Generals, regimental officers and men alike. The 5th Army never had success and was responsible for the loss of more lives uselessly that all the other Armies put together. Gough had no qualification for commansing an Army, neither intellectually nor by training.

"He is a gallant and dashing cavalry soldier whose proper place would have been leading a cavalry charge. Please God for the sake of the British Army and the cause for which we are fighting he will never be employed here again".

(Major General Oliver Nugent, commanding 36th Division, in a letter to his wife dated 9th April 1918,

from 'Major General Oliver Nugent and the Ulster Division 1915 - 1918' Army Record Society 2007.

[Robert Dunlop]

David, by way of contrast here is what the Earl of Stanhope wrote:

"General Gough has been roundly abused as a bad commander, a massacrer of troops, a murderer, etc. The truth is - and I got to know him well - that no Army Commander, with the possible exception of General Plumer who took more interest than General Gough in the preparation of rearward services, took more pains to make his preparations complete for a big attack than did General Gough." Source: B. Bond. 'War Memoirs of Earl Stanhope 1914-1918'. p. 131. Brighton.

High praise indeed.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

David, by way of contrast here is what the Earl of Stanhope wrote:

"General Gough has been roundly abused as a bad commander, a massacrer of troops, a murderer, etc. The truth is - and I got to know him well - that no Army Commander, with the possible exception of General Plumer who took more interest than General Gough in the preparation of rearward services, took more pains to make his preparations complete for a big attack than did General Gough." Source: B. Bond. 'War Memoirs of Earl Stanhope 1914-1918'. p. 131. Brighton.

High praise indeed.

Robert

Robert - Stanhope's book is excellent and I think I flagged the high regard he held Goughie in earlier on in the thread (didnt like Haig though). Stanhope's opinion of Gough just isnt borne out by the evidence we have, not least for 21st March.

On the other hand, it is difficult not to respect Nugent's view. Nugent was no fool, did not suffer fools and to the best of my knowledge, enjoyed the universal respect of all that served with him.

Regards,

Jonathan S

[David Filsell]

Yes, quote swapping always makes you rethink. The only addition I would make is that memory ( and I cannot support this with refereneces) tells me that there are a number of accounts which speak of the detestation officers and men had of serving under Gough. There is no doubt that he was at his best in October 1914 handling the (dismounted) cavalry at Ypres. I generally stay out of debates about the competance of the Genarals, we can all get too emotional about it. But I do still cleave to the view that Gough did little to be worthy of Army Command. He was it seems hasty, thrusting and unsystematic in his planning and he was costly with his mens' lives. Nugent does seem very sound sound and not, in his recently published letters, over keen on having a go at other commanders. Clearly, though, he did not rate Gough at all. In fact his is one of the most outright condemnations of any officer which I have seen made by another.

[Robert Dunlop]

Who would have thought that anyone could have said what Earl Stanhope did? How many examples are there that have never surfaced as evidence because they did not fit? What happens when we really examine Nugent's claims in detail? Was March 21 really as simple as is made out?

I don't doubt that Nugent meant what he said. I have seen the numerous other similar quotes. But if you look at the so-called 'slaughter' - say compare casualties under Gough vs Rawlinson on the Somme?? Or versus any other general?

It does not look straightforward to me. I just don't know.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Robert - what are you views on the fact that Nugent's opinion came from knowledge of a battlefield command whereas Stanhope's battlefield experience to the best of my memory was about 6 months as a Company Commander. Stanhope then spent about 3 years as a Staff Officer. Is this a reasonable consideration in evaluating these two views?

[Robert Dunlop]

Jonathan, I don't have any views one way or the other at the moment. I only know that Stanhope's comments are echoed to some degree in Simpson's book on corps-level command. These two in quick succession, coupled with my concern about what Travers for example previously wrote about Gough compared with the errors he has made in other parts of his works, has really given me pause for thought. Too early to say but I am now beginning to look at this more closely, FWIIW.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Just another interesting quote. This time from Brigadier General de Wiart, who was involved in Third Ypres, October 1917:

"In spite of our improvised brigade we had quite a successful battle, and on coming out of the line we met the army commander, General Sir Hubert Gough, who congratulated us. I had a great admiration for him and I fancy the Hun must have had too, though well spiced with hate, for 'Goughie' never gave them any peace. He was bounding with energy, and vitality oozed out of every pore, and though invariably he gave us hard battles I felt he always gave us a good run for our money."

Robert

[David Filsell]

Can't help feeling that's a typical fire-eating de Wiart VC comment but interesting no less