German Army on the Somme

[RodB]

My paperback copy finally arrived, 4 months after I ordered it ! I've read parts of it so far, in my usual grasshopper fashion. This does not presume to be a review, just me sharing some thoughs and inviting responses.

Several things come across :

Initiative : Junior and mid-level leaders, and even troops, think on their feet and improvise to continue to carry out the mission despite chaos, setbacks and lack of information.

Flexibility : Commanders on the ground put together flexible small-medium battle groups pretty much on-the-fly from what is available in the area and carry out missions with these battle groups, rather than relying on formal structures. Doesn't account for their low view of the British officers' military abilities, who they considered to be "sportsmen". Does this point to a difference in points of view and perception, or were the British mid-lower officers behind their German counterparts in military skills in 1916 ?

Very high morale of the men

Lack of shell-shock - men appear to survive the Britrish bombardment, which is described as extremely servere, with their wits apparently intact, even after digging themselves out of bunkers, and are able to immediately go into action. This seems in contrast to what I've read about later phases of the war, such as in 1918 where British troops appear paralysed after the Kaiserschlact bombardment. Was this a result of German training, biased reporting, or did the later bombardments up the pressure beyond human endurance limits ?

The Germans considered the British poorly trained and led. Is this a function of the fact that German troops had had 2 years training as conscripts ? My info is that it takes 2 years to properly train a soldier for combat. The implication is that after 2 years of war, the conscript army begins to lose its advantage over a citizen army. The Germans saw British officers, at least the ones they captured, as of excellent character but not very good militarily, more "sportsmen". Does this reflect more a difference in perception or attitude, or was this a fact ?

Cohesion. Units, even small ones, appear to keep going as they lose many men, without disintegrating. They just become smaller functioning units.

The picture is of a superb fighting machine that can only be defeated by much superior numbers via attrition. Which is what Haig did. But is this picture also a function of the fact that nobody reports all the stuffups they made in their career, soldiers included, and this book is based on narrative ? Also, does the fact that narratives are by definition provided by survivors, hence they will be biased towards successful troops and their actions - there are far fewer survivors of disasters, incompetent or otherwise, to tell the tale.

Rod

[Robert Dunlop]

Rod, there is a thread on this book here:

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=616592

With respect to shell shock, there is no comparison between the intensity of the British bombardment on the Somme with any of the major bombardments, from any side, during 1918.

Robert