Britain, South Africa and the East African Campaign

[bushfighter]

"Britain, South Africa and the East African Campaign - The Union Comes of Age" by Anne Samson.

Taurus Academic Studies 2006. ISBN: 1 84511 040 4. EAN 978 1 84511 040 6.

This book has been published as No 4 in the International Library of Colonial History series.

The manuscript was submitted as a thesis, so be prepared to just wince and move on quickly whenever you come across the several factual errors about military aspects of the East African Campaign, but slow down when the author develops her thoughts on the political policies of all the relevant allies towards German East Africa.

She argues that Britain did not have a coherent policy towards GEA in August 1914, and the Royal Navy had a free hand to attack Dar Es Salaam and Tanga.

After the military reverses at Tanga and Jasin the War Office controlled policy and put the theatre on the defensive, much to the annoyance of the Colonial Office who wanted to ocupy GEA and be able to construct a Cape to Cairo railway.

When South Africa (under the leadership of Botha and Smuts) had put down the Afrikaaner Rebellion and successfully seized German South West Africa, South African troops were offered for the invasion of GEA.

The author, using numerous documentary references, claims that South Africa's real ambition was to obtain territory in Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) up to the Zambezi River, and that the best way of doing this appeared to be to seize GEA and then exchange part of GEA for the desired piece of Portuguese territory.

The plot develops as France relinquishes claims to GEA in exchange for being given almost a free hand in the former German Cameroons in West Africa.

(France had offered troops from Madagascar for the East African Campaign, but the British did not want French boots leaving imprints on GEA territory.)

India, as a principal troop and supplies provider for the theatre, also had a claim on GEA territory to be used to re-settle ex-servicemen as farmers.

Britain does not appear to have entertained this claim and South Africa did not want more Indians in Africa.

Belgium seized areas in GEA by force of arms, but in the end only retained Ruanda-Urundi (Rwanda and Burundi). Belgium's real territorial ambition was to obtain a piece of Portuguese West Africa (Angola) at the south of the mouth of the Congo River, so that she could develop both river banks.

To facilitate this Belgium's new Rwanda-Urundi territory was to be given to Britain, so that Britain could compensate Portugal with other GEA territory.

This plotting was done without consultation with the Portuguese who, when they found out about it, refused to exchange anything because of national pride. (Portugal did eventually receive a small triangle of GEA territory on the northern PEA boundary.)

The final nail in the coffin for the British and South African conspirators was the USA's Peace Conference stand against the former German colonies becoming new colonies of the victorious Allies.

The USA insisted on mandates, not new colonies (to the disappointment of Australia and New Zealand also, who were hoping to seize former German Pacific colonies).

Botha, the realist, accepted this and the mandate system was put into affect, South Africa managing the affairs of the former German South West Africa and Britain managing the former GEA, now named Tanganyika.

The USA was the only Great Power who looked at the allocation of former German colonies with any kind of sympathy towards the indigenous inhabitants.

This is a serious but interesting book. The price is not cheap, and so it may be best to obtain a copy through your local library.

When commenting about the National Archives the author makes a useful point:

"It should be mentioned that it has proven more fruitful using the paper indices than the online catalogue which tends to ignore a large number of the references."

Harry