Forgotten Victory : First World War Myths and Realities

[RodB]

Sheffield's main thesis is that World War I was a necessary war for Britain to fight, to prevent a (bad) hegemonic power arising in Europe which could/would threaten Britain's survival/interests. He presents the Entente as an alliance of democratic powers versus militaristic non-democracies. He presents Germany as looting and pillaging Belgium's resources, as an example of its barbarity.

My response :

He completely ignores the fact the third entente partner Russia was a dictatorship. Britain's postwar opposition to the Bolsheviks, who arguably had majority support in Russia, indicates it was less interested in democracy than a "stable" system safely controlled by friendly middle-class elites.

Britain originally created Belgium to serve its own selfish interests i.e. as an artificial deliberately weak neutral state, to keep major powers away from what it saw as "its" coastline in Europe. Events today indicate Belgium is breaking up and reverting to its true state of 2 separate peoples who wish to rejoin what they see as their parent states.

Germany didn't do anything in Belgium that Britain didn't do in its own colonies, especially India. E.g. how Britain deliberately destroyed the Indian textile industry. This is how the strong treat the weak.

A united Europe with Germany as its major power is growing today, with Britain looking on from the sidelines. Again, this is how history and power works and is precisely what occurred in North America. Then as now, Britain's major problem with this was that it had little influence in such an arrangement. A German hegemony in Europe in 1914 would be little different to today.

Militarism and authoritarianism, the labels given to Wilhelmine Germany, are value-judgements rather than accurate descriptions. Germany had limits on conscription (1% of population) and it was only its large population that gave it a large army. Any reading of British Victorian publications shows Britain equally as jingoistic and militaristic. I suspect Britain's real complaint was that the German army was truly first-rate rather than the disorganised rabbles it preferred to slaughter in its colonial campaigns.

Sheffield casually notes that during the war Britain even brought about near-universal sufferage. So not a full democracy pre-war then ? He also notes that pre-war Germany had a basic social welfare and pensions system, unlike Britain. So just how barbaric was Germany then ?

He accuses the Kaiser of possibly being unbalanced. Here he is on stronger ground but draws the wrong conclusion. A weakness of the German political system was that it gave great powers to a single person with no mechanism for dismissing him if he proved incompetent. But the evidence indicates that the Kaiser could not wage a protracted war, or even a short fullscale war, if the Reichstag refused to appropriate funds. In the event the Reichstag did appropriate funds, and hence Germany waged war as a democratic entity, as the Reichstag was elected by majority suffrage. Much as the US waged war on Iraq.

The Germany that went to war in 1914 was the Germany of Goethe, Beethoven, Nietsche, Leibnitz, as well as that of Krupp. It was just as "civilised", arguably more so, as/than Britain. Sheffield points out that Britain and its "democratic" allies found themselves being forced to adopt the same ruthless approach as their enemies in the war because their survival was at stake. He refuses to allow that Germany, as a civilised state, could see itself in the same position in first having to wage a pre-emptive war (against the potentially extremely strong Russian dictatorship and the France which under Napoleon tried to destroy it) and then wage a continuing total war. Peace only came when the US acknowledged Germany's security dilemma by bringing it into NATO. Which brings us back to a united and secure Europe - it could have occurred in 1914 if Britain had kept out.

In summary, 1 million people of the British Empire died to prop up a failing system for another 50 years until it inevitably collapsed, leaving Britain with no Empire, Germany dominating Europe and Russia exactly where it was before as the frustrated outsider. Sheffield presents Britain at the time as committed to maintaining the "balance of power" in Europe by traditionally supporting weaker powers agains any emerging hegemons or dominant powers. He thus presents the British gevernment, and especially forein minister Grey, as having little choice but to oppose Germany. But historically "balance of power" politics has been a dangerous game which requires politicians and diplomats of exceptional skill to play, such as Disreali before this government. War has been the result of failed policy and diplomacy, not the preferred way of maintaining a balance of power. Grey and Asquith with their nod-and-wink entente with France and Russia would be seen as threatening to any sane German, i.e. tipping the European power balance to the side of the entente rather than maintaining stability. Certainly France, which stood to regain Alsace and Lorraine, did and said nothing to restrain Russia in the leadup. The "balance of power" required that Britain stay out of Europe. Grey failed to grasp this.

Rod

(this is not intended as an anti-British diatribe, it is intended as cold historical analysis)

[George Armstrong Custer]

(this is not intended as an anti-British diatribe, it is intended as cold historical analysis)

It sounds, Rod, that in addition to Sheffield's Forgotten Victory, you've also read John Charmley's Splendid Isolation: Britain & The Balance of Power 1874-1914 so closely does your argument follow the latter's take - particularly in respect to Britain staying out of round 1 in 1914 and sympathetically glossing the nature of the Wilhelmine State. Suffice to say that Charmley, a deliberately controversial (it sells books) professor of British history at the University of East Anglia, also wrote a biography of Churchill in which he seriously proposed that Churchill ought to have come to terms with Nazi Germany in 1940.

ciao,

GAC

[RodB]

That and a lot of others. Some of which, like Sheffield's, look at all the gravestones and can't accept that it was all for nothing so have to invent a meaning, and others that take a longterm view of history and look beyond the "we are good and they are/were bad" rationalisations . But you didn't address the question - quoting Charmley's views on Churchill does not constitute a rebuttal of my views on Grey or "Forgotten Victory". Further, get the name of the book right : "Splendid Isolation ?" Get it ?

Rod

[Alan Tucker]

Sheffield's main thesis is that World War I was a necessary war for Britain to fight, to prevent a (bad) hegemonic power arising in Europe which could/would threaten etc

You need to make clear here that Sheffield is analysing this from the point of view of British governments at that time.

My response :

He completely ignores the fact the third entente partner Russia was a dictatorship. Britain's postwar opposition to the Bolsheviks, who arguably had majority support in Russia, indicates it was less interested in democracy than a "stable" system safely controlled by friendly middle-class elites.

But the British people (as opposed to the Govt who used the argument for their own reasons) did think it was a war for freedom and liberty irrespective of our Great War ally in the east! Does the fact we hitched up to Uncle Joe in the Second World War undermine the fact that we fought for freedom and democracy?

A German hegemony in Europe in 1914 would be little different to today.

Extraordinary statement - I am sure the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine and the Poles would have felt rather differently to use two examples. Those under German occupation in France and Belgium really felt it was a benign hegemony. . Germany was already some way towards achieving an economic predominance and did not need to make it a military one.

Militarism and authoritarianism, the labels given to Wilhelmine Germany, are value-judgements rather than accurate descriptions.

I think you need to read a bit of V.R.Berghahn, Gordon Craig and others

He accuses the Kaiser of possibly being unbalanced. Here he is on stronger ground but draws the wrong conclusion. A weakness of the German political system was that it gave great powers to a single person with no mechanism for dismissing him if he proved incompetent. But the evidence indicates that the Kaiser could not wage a protracted war, or even a short fullscale war, if the Reichstag refused to appropriate funds. In the event the Reichstag did appropriate funds, and hence Germany waged war as a democratic entity, as the Reichstag was elected by majority suffrage. Much as the US waged war on Iraq.

You need to read up on the actual powers of the Reichstag with no ministerial accountability. The features of German political and welfare systems were a clever Bismarckian fig-leaf to buy off the working classes with a facade of democracy. It worked - it kept the German Social Democrats to an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary path.

The Germany that went to war in 1914 was the Germany of Goethe, Beethoven, Nietsche, Leibnitz, as well as that of Krupp. It was just as "civilised", arguably more so, as/than Britain. ....... Which brings us back to a united and secure Europe - it could have occurred in 1914 if Britain had kept out.

This is school playground stuff. Who was more civilised than who in 1914? Secure Europe for who?

In summary, 1 million people of the British Empire died to prop up a failing system for another 50 years until it inevitably collapsed, leaving Britain with no Empire, Germany dominating Europe and Russia exactly where it was before as the frustrated outsider. Sheffield presents Britain at the time as committed to maintaining the "balance of power" in Europe by traditionally supporting weaker powers agains any emerging hegemons or dominant powers. He thus presents the British gevernment, and especially forein minister Grey, as having little choice but to oppose Germany. But historically "balance of power" politics has been a dangerous game which requires politicians and diplomats of exceptional skill to play, such as Disreali before this government. War has been the result of failed policy and diplomacy, not the preferred way of maintaining a balance of power. Grey and Asquith with their nod-and-wink entente with France and Russia would be seen as threatening to any sane German, i.e. tipping the European power balance to the side of the entente rather than maintaining stability. Certainly France, which stood to regain Alsace and Lorraine, did and said nothing to restrain Russia in the leadup. The "balance of power" required that Britain stay out of Europe. Grey failed to grasp this.

Too much hindsight being used here. Balance of power was in our interests as a country and had worked very successfully down to 1914. It was never a dangerous game - the big problem in 1914 was that Germany had a leader who was not willing to play the diplomatic game and made the most disastrous decision of them all - the 'blank cheque' to Austra-Hungary to use force against Serbia which meant in the very least an Austro-Russian war. Bismarck had also played the balance of power game very successfully until Wilhelm II changed direction and put Germany on a course to war. The difference in 1914 is that we committed a large land force to the continent for the first time in an attempt to rebalance. The Great War did not mean the end of Empire; in some ways it was stronger in 1919 than 1914. In fact the Empire never collapsed - there was a succession of retreats some managed better than others. It is true that Germany feared encirclement but presumably this meant by France and Russia. Britain was uncommitted until the last moment. The pre-emptive strike through Belgium was a direct consequence of the earlier decision to encourage rather than restrain her Austran ally.

In trying to have a dig at Sheffield you are making plenty of value judgements of your own.

[George Armstrong Custer]

That and a lot of others. Some of which, like Sheffield's, look at all the gravestones and can't accept that it was all for nothing so have to invent a meaning, and others that take a longterm view of history and look beyond the "we are good and they are/were bad" rationalisations . But you didn't address the question - quoting Charmley's views on Churchill does not constitute a rebuttal of my views on Grey. Further, get the name of the book right : "Splendid Isolation ?" Get it ?

Rod

OK, Rod, but I respond with some reluctance as I note on your Profile that you 'Suspect a conspiracy' in everything taught in history and politics, and conspiracy theorists aren't normally ready to see much beyond that. But just to focus on your closing statement on Grey:

The "balance of power" required that Britain stay out of Europe. Grey failed to grasp this.

You conspicuously fail to mention the naval arms race between Britain and Germany. Are you seriously saying that Britain could or should have stayed out in 1914 and allowed Germany to overrun France, thereby giving her naval bases along the Channel and French Atlantic coastline? That wouldn't have affected the 'balance of power' in Europe (and the wider world)? And it wasn't in Britain's national and Imperial self-interest to prevent this?

As to Charmley. I mentioned his views on Churchill because they clearly demonstrate what a professional contrarian he is - dangerously so in so far as disseminating the idea that we should have worked with rather than fought the Nazis in 1940 - that's the territory of the odious Alan Clark. Even though your first post didn't mention him, Charmley's ideas on the coming of the Great War from Splendid Isolation came through loud and clear. You now confirm him as a source and clearly have swallowed his ideas hook, line and sinker. According to Charmley's books Britain should have given the Kaiser a free hand in Europe in 1914, but Grey having failed to grasp that, we should have come to terms with Nazi Germany after they had overrun France in 1940, something Churchill in turn failed to grasp. Yeah, right.

ciao,

GAC

[Chris_Baker]

He presents Germany as looting and pillaging Belgium's resources, as an example of its barbarity.

Your point being? I would have though that German behaviour in occupied Belgium and France was a perfect example.

[Crunchy]

Britain's postwar opposition to the Bolsheviks, who arguably had majority support in Russia,

Rod,

I am not sure what figures you are using but from most accounts the Bolsheviks did not have majority support when they seized power - in fact they had little support amongst the population and even amongst the socialist revolutionary groups who actually opposed them.

Regards

Chris

[west coast]

is it just my [very] limited knowledge of the first world war and its beginnings, or can i sence a david irving type view/opinion on britains part in the war?. mike.

[RodB]

That's for you to decide Mike. Have you read David Irving, such as where in The Destruction of Dresden the young boy destroys the bust of his hero Hitler because he has brought destruction to his people ?

I'm trying to view the issue from the point of view of educated cultured sane German politicians in the years 1900 - 1914. My experience of life tells me they would have been pretty similar to politicians in Britain, France, Italy, the US etc. They inherited a system based on hardheaded realist politics inherited from Bismarck which had survival as its main priority.

The problem I have with positions like Gary Sheffield's is that they somehow assume that Germany and its politicians were of a different (read barbaric) breed to the peaceloving British and French, when in fact all the major powers were driven by the same core needs as Germany - to guarantee survival, to extend power and influence while trying to diminish power and influence of rivals. Take the German behaviour in Belgium. Yes it was brutal, yes German troops got trigger-happy over alleged/suspected franc-tireurs. Yes the country was wrecked. But this was a by-product of war and is inevitable in such circumstances. Military occupation is always a disaster. The US actions in Iraq look pretty similar, so does the British treatment of Boer civilians in 1900-1902. It's too easy to treat Wilhelmine Germany as somehow different.

My argument is that Britain failed to handle the inevitable emergence of Germany as a great power, at a political level. They chose to try to both contain and confront it by building balance-of-power alliances. This had the opposite effect, of making Germany feel threatened. You can choose to view the buildup of the German navy as either a threat and challenge to Britain which Britain could not ignore; as just one of the things that great powers do and have every right to do; or as a stupid exercise in national hubris. But building Dreadnought did not help, and Germany was within its rights to challenge, albeit indirectly, Britain's dominance of the region's sealanes. This was tacitly acknowledged in Wilson's fourteen points which insisted on freedom of the seas and Britain was unhappy with.

How could Britain have handled Germany's rise without ending up with war ? My thesis is that Britain's dealings with France amounted to a blank cheque, an assurance that they would stand with France and Russia against Germany no matter what, without actually putting it in writing. This allowed Grey to tell cabinet that Britain was not committed while everybody else knew they were. This gave Germany the message that they were eventually doomed. Yes, they handled it badly. But Bethmann Hollweg was correct when he referred to the Belgium treaty as a "scrap of paper" because it existed only to keep the flanders coast safe for Britain.

My point is that it's too easy and just plain incorrect to present the allies as fighting for freedom, justice, democracy and civilisation, against militaristic undemocratic powercrazed invaders. All the colonial powers were pretty barbaric towards those too weak to stand up to them.

[centurion]

the Bolsheviks, who arguably had majority support in Russia, indicates it was less interested in democracy than a "stable" system safely controlled by friendly middle-class elites.

Who actually came to power through a coup d'etat replacing a post Czarist government that arose from a genuine revolution. There was never anything democratic about the subsequent regime. All governments was friendly neighbours regardless of the regime.

[RodB]

My reading of the February revolution is that it was little more than Tsarism minus the Tsar. The Provisional government continued the war long after it lost mass support - a war which a discredited former government had started (by mobilising) and which had no meaning to ordinary Russians. But Kerensky wanted to keep shipping them off to the front. It was the soldiers and workers who first urged the Soviet to "take power, you ********" to replace the failed Duma. The Soviet did not, leaving the Bolsheviks as the agent of change. Initially the Bolsheviks appear to have strong support among peasants, workers and soldiers. Which was almost everybody. The numbers : the Bolsheviks had 300 of the 670 Soviet deputies, which represented the opinion of the mass of the population, and hence in the absence of democratic elections so far (promised by the Provisional government since February) the only available determinant of mass popular will. The walkout of the Mensheviks and SRs on October 25th gave the Bolsheviks together with the Left SRs a majority, hence the right to form a government, and though not preferable it was legitimate for the overwhelmingly dominant party in a coalition to take for itself all the positions in a Cabinet – Sovnarkom.

There is a trend whereby centre-right historians refer to a Bolshevik "coup" and centre and left writers refer to a revolution. The Bolsheviks just filled a power vacuum. The fact that they refused to depart in 1918 after they lost the election is a different issue. But that election was certainly not won by the adherents of the old regime, it was won by moderate leftists.

[Alan Tucker]

I'm trying to view the issue from the point of view of educated cultured sane German politicians in the years 1900 - 1914. My experience of life tells me they would have been pretty similar to politicians in Britain, France, Italy, the US etc. They inherited a system based on hardheaded realist politics inherited from Bismarck which had survival as its main priority.

You seem to think that German 'politicians' had any real power or influence - this is the crucial difference with the four democracies cited where there was ministerial responsibility. What the Kaiser said went - sometimes he listened to his civilian ministers, sometimes his 'military cabinet'. In any event he decided. Compare and contrast with the discussions in the British Cabinet in late July 1914.

The problem I have with positions like Gary Sheffield's is that they somehow assume that Germany and its politicians were of a different (read barbaric) breed to the peaceloving British and French, when in fact all the major powers were driven by the same core needs as Germany - to guarantee survival, to extend power and influence while trying to diminish power and influence of rivals.

I do not remember Sheffield's book as taking such a simplistic position. You need some quotations to back this up.

My argument is that Britain failed to handle the inevitable emergence of Germany as a great power, at a political level. They chose to try to both contain and confront it by building balance-of-power alliances.

Er 'alliances' pre-1914. One with Japan (1902). Britain had no objections to Germany as an emergent Great Power and was willing to sit down and negotiate during the Scramble for Africa and did at Algy-serious and Agadir. The problem was Germany's behaviour as an aggressive new power e.g. secrecy over naval building; hitching herself unconditionally to the Austro-Hungarian wagon; avoiding Grey's overtures for a conference in the final days. The Kaiser's explosive personality e.g. Daily Telegraph affair.

How could Britain have handled Germany's rise without ending up with war ? My thesis is that Britain's dealings with France amounted to a blank cheque, an assurance that they would stand with France and Russia against Germany no matter what, without actually putting it in writing. This allowed Grey to tell cabinet that Britain was not committed while everybody else knew they were. This gave Germany the message that they were eventually doomed. Yes, they handled it badly.

The British Government gave no such open-ended assurance to France and Russia - 'no matter what'. Yes we held the secret military talks with France - understandable given German behaviour. But right down to the wire we kept our freedom of action and would make a decision based on circumstances. Lloyd George and others were unwilling to go to war to preserve our security on the English Channel and thereby our Great Power status as it would be difficult to justify to the British people but the German entry into Belgium gave the waverers a good reason for war - to fight for the rights of small nations etc. Do you actually believe that if the war had been limited to Austria v Russia we would have fought for Russia!

My point is that it's too easy and just plain incorrect to present the allies as fighting for freedom, justice, democracy and civilisation, against militaristic undemocratic powercrazed invaders. All the colonial powers were pretty barbaric towards those too weak to stand up to them.

But they were invaders and Britain fought to liberate most of Belgium and northern France. Yes it was also in our interests to do so.

[Alan Tucker]

There is a trend whereby centre-right historians refer to a Bolshevik "coup" and centre and left writers refer to a revolution. The Bolsheviks just filled a power vacuum. The fact that they refused to depart in 1918 after they lost the election is a different issue. But that election was certainly not won by the adherents of the old regime, it was won by moderate leftists.

This is not a left-right thing. There was multi-headed revolutionary situation in Russia in the autumn of 1917. This included a revolution in the countryside (land seizures by the peasants), a revolution in the towns with the breakdown of authority; a revolution amongst the national minorities. The Bolsheviks emerged as the most disciplined group as a consequence of Lenin's April theses putting Marxist theory on its head. To achieve power Trotsky organised the seizure of power in the capital - i.e. the key points. This was a coup against all the other groups vying for power and was immediately consolidated by Lenin's 'peace, land and bread' speech which was in tune with the popular mood.